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The past decade has seen tremendous economic 
growth in Brazil, a development that has changed the 
country’s relations with its main trading partners, in-
cluding the major global powers. Brazil now ranks as 
the ninth biggest trading partner of the EU.1 Brazil 
represents an important destination for EU exports 
(EUR 35.7 billion), and the EU accounts for close to 
a quarter (EUR 37.7 billion) of Brazilian exports. But 
while this makes the EU an important market for Bra-
zilian goods, Brazil is still remarkably less salient as a 
market to the EU, ranking well below its BRIC fellows 
China and Russia, and marginally below India. 
Politically, Brazil has established itself as an indis-
putable partner of the EU, having shown great glo-
bal aspirations, and having taken the lead in many 
South–South initiatives. Brazil thus became impor-
tant enough to catch the interest of Brussels, and in 
2007 the EU granted it “strategic partnership” status, 
together with the United States, Canada, Japan, Rus-
sia, China, India, and Mexico. 
A mighty pain to love it is, 
And ‘tis a pain that pain to miss; 
But of all pains, the greatest pain 
It is to love, but love in vain. 
– Abraham Cowley
1 For updated figures from the European Commission, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-rela-
tions/countries/brazil/ and http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/september/tradoc_113359.pdf.
Summary
The EU accorded the status of “strategic partner” 
to Brazil in 2007. While the aim of this was to foster 
more effective cooperation with the Latin American 
giant, the record of the partnership is less than clear. 
While the strategic partnership was a clear acknowl-
edgement of Brazil’s aspirations and status potential, 
it may have been sealed too late to have an impact 
on Brazil’s trajectory towards a more prominent glo-
bal role, and may mean too little for actually chang-
ing the course of EU–Brazil relations. 
For, viewed from Brasilia, the extent to which the 
special partnership has affected the relationship 
between the EU and Brazil remains an open ques-
tion. Despite its new status as a strategic partner, 
Brazil’s foreign policy has been surfing on the waves 
of South–South cooperation schemes. So while the 
EU remains a market for Brazilian exports which can-
not be overlooked, Brazil’s search for new partners 
and China’s increased prominence in its trade bal-
ance have provided a new range of opportunities in 
foreign policy.  
As other states, including Norway, are now working 
out strategies to seal more formalized relationships 
with Brazil – and other emerging powers, for that 
matter – the strategic partnership between Brazil 
and the EU offers important lessons to take into ac-
count. While the strategic partnership was initially 
more valuable for Brazil, this did not last. Further-
more, it was unclear what the new label entailed in 
practice, and how it was supposed to affect actual 
cooperation patterns.
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In this Policy Brief we argue that, contrary to expec-
tations, the status of “strategic partner” proved insuf-
ficient for bringing about more effective cooperation 
with the Latin American giant. Two reasons sustain 
this argument: first, the lack of substantive outcomes; 
second, the changing perceptions of the EU’s rele-
vance for Brazil’s global outreach.
A Strategic Partnership
The year 2007 marked the beginning of a new turn in 
relations between Brazil and the EU, with Brazil accord-
ed the status of a strategic partner of the EU. Various 
factors figured in the background to this decision. One 
important factor here was Brazil’s association with the 
“emerging powers” Russia, India and China through 
the BRIC label and partnership. Here we may note that 
among these four BRIC nations, Brazil was the last one 
to be considered an EU strategic partner. But where-
as its growth rates have not been comparable to those 
of China – or India, for that matter – Brazil has other 
important assets. To the EU, Brazil’s important natu-
ral resources were central, as was the country’s great 
industrial diversity and innovation, combined with its 
vast domestic market. Equally important for pushing 
the partnership ahead were Brazil’s decisive role within 
Mercosur and its position as the largest recipient of EU 
investments in Latin America.
The perceived cultural proximity between the EU and 
Brazil remains another factor that has contributed to 
the consolidation of the strategic partnership: by and 
large, the two share many of the same values and prin-
ciples. There are reasons to maintain that, among the 
BRICs, it is Brazil that converges the most with the EU 
at the normative level. They both have a strong commit-
ment to the promotion of a multilateral order based on 
compliance with the rule of law, democracy, and respect 
of human rights, and they have tended to ratify the in-
ternational regimes under the UN system.
Against this backdrop, also other factors contribute to 
explain why Brazil was granted such status by the EU.2 
First, the increase in Brazilian assertiveness on the 
international arena gave rise to perceptions that Bra-
zil deserved a different status among the Latin Ameri-
can countries. Brazil’s leadership in establishing the 
agricultural G-20, its significant victories against the 
developed countries at the WTO and its progressive 
importance within the financial G-20 are examples of 
this assertiveness. A second reason relates to cultural 
proximity. Aside from the above-mentioned normative 
factors, an important illustration is the social dimen-
sion of Brazil’s foreign policy under president Lula, 
which had attracted the attention of European leaders. 
Here we may also mention the high-profile domestic 
cash transfer program known as Bolsa Familia, which 
became a model for other countries and rapidly gained 
renown. Finally, European perceptions of Brazil as a 
regional leader contributed to the EU’s decision to es-
tablish the agreement with Brazil. In this respect, Bra-
zil’s consolidated democracy also meant an opportunity 
for counterbalancing what were deemed radical voices 
from Venezuela and Bolivia within Latin America.
The establishment of the partnership allowed the rela-
tionship between the EU and Brazil continue to evolve 
and grow. Even in some of the most difficult trading 
conditions on record between the EU and Brazil, trade 
grew by almost 15% in 2008. Today, Brazil remains the 
EU’s most significant trade and investment partner in 
Latin America. While the strategic partnership may 
have been more a reflection of European reactions to 
considerable shifts in the global configuration of power 
in contemporary international politics, it may also have 
served both partners’ desire to gain legitimacy as global 
actors.
This being said, it may also be argued that the strategic 
partnership was initially more valuable for Brazil than 
for the EU in terms of global image. Whereas Brazil 
in 2007 was viewed mainly as a regional power, today 
most states have acknowledged its global reach. The 
strategic partner agreement meant one step forward 
in Brazil’s aspirations to enhance its global status.  In 
this regard, its rapid recovery from the world economic 
crisis of 2008 certainly helped to convince the interna-
tional community of the need to acknowledge Brazil’s 
new status. 
Despite major nominal gains, however, it is unclear 
what this new label entails in practice. As Andrew Rett-
man has pointed out in the EU Observer, “the term ‘stra-
tegic partner’ is ill-defined in EU usage. In practice, it 
means boosting a foreign country’s diplomatic status 
and organizing summits and extra minister-level and 
expert-level meetings. But it can also be taken to mean 
an alternative to fully-fledged EU membership.”3 One 
EU diplomat has been quoted as noting that strategic 
partnerships are “like love – no one can define it. You 
only know what it is when you experience it.” Another 
EU diplomat remarks that the term had been thought 
up a few years earlier “without anyone ever really de-
fining what it meant and whether, indeed, the others 
regard us as their strategic partners.”4  
2 For a detailed analysis, see Estevão C. de Rezende Martins and 
Miriam Gomes Saraiva (eds.) Brasil, União Europeia, América do 
Sul: anos 2010-2020. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer
3 Andrew Rettman (2010) “Ashton designates six new ‘strategic 
partners’,” EU Observer, 16. October. Available at http://euob-
server.com/18/30828.
4  Ibid.
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Despite the opacity surrounding the concept of strate-
gic partnership, a special relationship with Brazil has 
become an important building block in the EU’s rela-
tion with emerging powers, as political and economic 
differences with both China and India have surfaced. 
In the case of Brazil, it has created a different dynam-
ics, evidenced by more transparent consultations on 
key multilateral issues. And while the partnership has 
few concrete outcomes to show, it has highlighted the 
extent to which the EU sees Brazil as an actor with 
whom it can engage on a routine basis with respect to 
all global themes. 
Viewed from Brasilia, however, the extent to which the 
special partnership has affected the relationship be-
tween the EU and Brazil remains an open question. 
Despite its new status as a strategic partner, Brazil’s 
foreign policy has been surfing on the waves of South–
South cooperation schemes. This would indicate that 
EU–Brazil relations, especially under the Lula govern-
ment, became cordial but distant. One central dimen-
sion of this problem is the gap between how the EU 
sees itself and how it is perceived by its global partners. 
While the EU has long sought to project itself as a dy-
namic global actor, it still has limited room to accom-
modate new requests from external actors. Despite 
the partnership, Brazil has therefore continued to deal 
with EU states mostly through the means of intergov-
ernmental relations.5 In this case, the EU seems to be 
diminishing in relevance, as Brazilian diplomats con-
sider it more fruitful to communicate with traditional 
nation-states than with representatives of the EU in or-
der to get things done. 
The EU’s lack of strategic appeal to Brazil is especially 
evident in the case of the reform of the UN Security 
Council, where Brazil has long aspired to and assertive-
ly campaigned for a permanent seat. While the USA 
has openly supported India’s candidacy, the EU has re-
mained conspicuously silent on the matter, largely due 
to the lack of internal consensus and to institutional 
limitations. But as Brazil rises, it has also become a 
more difficult partner to handle. The traditional powers 
have seen the Brazilian gambit in Iran and its recent 
votes on the Libyan case as cases in point. 
While Brazil is in quest of greater autonomy, China 
represents an important piece in the Brazilian strate-
gy. As Tullo and Cepaluni have noted, “In the works of 
Latin American academics, autonomy is a notion that 
refers to a foreign policy free from constraints imposed 
by powerful countries.”6 This clearly reflects Brasilia’s 
skepticism regarding the role of the Washington, tradi-
tionally perceived as “old-style command relations with 
Latin America.”7 Fears of US abuses in the region have 
contributed to the vision of the EU as a good counterbal-
ance. This view gained importance particularly in the 
period when negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement 
of the Americas (FTAA) topped the agenda. However, 
since 2005 this has no longer been the case, and the 
EU has definitely lost clout. The fruitless inter-regional 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur are a fur-
ther reason behind the changing Brazilian perceptions 
of the EU’s relevance.
In this context, Brazil’s lukewarm embrace of the EU 
is also linked with the increased Chinese presence in 
Latin America. As Günther Maihold has argued,
the EU must realize that the new presence of China on 
the sub-continent has caused a profound change in this 
privileged partnership. It has had an impact on Latin 
America’s perception of what Europe has to offer, even 
if the impact is not yet highly visible. Despite all the re-
served and even critical evaluations of this situation’s 
benefits for Latin America over the medium term, one 
must consider this element as the impetus for develop-
ing a new profile for relations between Europe and Latin 
America. In the current international situation, Europe 
is no longer something that the countries of South 
America need, but rather an option they can pursue or 
not pursue.8 
So while the EU remains a market for Brazilian ex-
ports which cannot be overlooked, Brazil’s search for 
new partners and China’s increased prominence in its 
trade balance have provided a new range of opportu-
nities in foreign policy. Briefly put, close cooperation 
with the EU is a valuable option for Brazil – but it is 
no longer essential.
The uneasy relationship between trade and aid has 
also affected the possibilities for EU–Brazilian coop-
eration. As Andrew Hurrell reminds us, many of the 
aspiring great powers 
5 See Lessa, Antonio Carlos (2009) “No canteiro das idéias: 
uma reflexão sobre o conceito de parceria estratégica na ação 
internacional do Brasil à luz das suas relações com a União 
Européia,” in de Rezende Martins and Gomes Saraiva (eds.), 
cited in footnote 2 above, at  p. 122.
6 Vigevani, Tullo, and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010) Brazilian Foreign 
Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy From Sarney 
to Lula. Lexington Books, p.1.
7  Ibid., p. 4.
8 Maihold, Günther (2007) Relations Between Europe and Latin 
America: In Search of New Agendas and Formats Working Pa-
per 43/200, Real Insutto Elcano, p. 13. Available at: http://www.
realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/WP2007/WP43-2007_
Maihold_Europe_Latin_America_Agenda.pdf13
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have identified themselves more specifically as develop-
ing countries and have understood their foreign policy 
options through the prism of North–South relations. 
This has been a persistent theme in the case of India; 
in the case of Brazil it has been a more ambiguous one, 
but one that is clearly in the ascendant under the present 
government. If so, what happens if that “developing 
country identity” comes into conflict with the ‘aspiring 
great power identity’?9  
While Brazil in certain arenas touts its emerging 
great-power status, in other forums it represents the 
developing world, or even itself as a development part-
ner. This tension makes close cooperation with Brazil 
potentially challenging for the EU.10 
 
The EU’s recognition of Brazil as a strategic partner is 
a clear acknowledgement of Brazil’s foreign-policy as-
pirations and status potential. However, the strategic 
partnership may have been sealed too late to have an 
impact on Brazil’s trajectory towards a more promi-
nent global role, and may mean too little for actually 
changing the course of EU–Brazil relations.
Conclusion: The Need for Relevance
Paradoxically, the EU lost relevance as seen from Bra-
zil precisely when the latter was awarded a strategic 
partnership. While there is little doubt that the part-
nership has been important to Brazil, as it has contrib-
uted to fulfilling its desire for external recognition and 
legitimacy, it is insufficient as a measure that could 
substantively place the EU at the top of Brazil’s agen-
da, and vice-versa. 
With other states now seeing the possibility of 
strengthening their relations with Brazil, the lessons 
that can be drawn from the strategic partnership be-
tween Brazil and the EU are important to take into ac-
count. Consider the case of Norway: Brazil is the locus 
of a major Norwegian financial investment and export 
market; it is the largest receiver of development aid, 
and is becoming increasingly more important as the 
site of Norwegian offshore drilling efforts. The case 
for the importance of Brazil to Norway is self-evident. 
But why should Brazil need Norway? That appears 
to be a more challenging question. And while there 
was a window of opportunity at a time where Brazil 
was courting recognition of its global aspirations – to 
which Norway could have contributed – that time has 
now passed. Any future partnership with Brazil must 
heed the experiences of the EU, and must involve 
deeds more than words. Any strategy aimed at increas-
ing collaboration must focus on how to be relevant to a 
power to which more and more options are becoming 
available.
 9 Hurrell, Andrew (2006) “Hegemony, liberalism and global or-
der: what space for would be great powers?” International Af-
fairs, vol. 82, p. 19.
10 While the EU often flags its concern for development, its trade 
barriers affect many developing economies, including that of 
Brazil—a factor not without significance in explaining the EU’s 
challenges in cooperating closely with the developing world.
